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Director Notes

The Potential Cost and Value of ERM
by Michelle Harner

The concept of enterprise risk management (ERM) as a holistic approach
to managing a company’s risk proﬁle has tremendous appeal. However,
companies are frequently skeptical about its value and whether the results
will justify the cost, effort, and challenges of implementing a meaningful
ERM process.1 This report considers some of those concerns and highlights
the governance, compliance, and cultural value of ERM.
Risk management is not a new concept. Companies have
been, at the very least, considering and modeling financial risk
for quite some time.2 ERM is a holistic approach to managing
a company’s risk profile.3 It encourages boards of directors to
foster and embrace a risk-aware culture that supports firmwide communication. By empowering individuals at multiple
levels within and across an organization to identify, assess,
and communicate about risk exposure, boards can more
effectively work with their management teams to mitigate
and monitor risks.4 The objective of ERM is not to eliminate
all risks, but rather to maintain a level of risk that aligns
with the company’s risk appetite.5
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Despite ERM’s potential benefits, conversations about
implementing it are often informal, disjointed, siloed, and
incomplete.6 Moreover, the failings of a company’s risk
management approach typically are not exposed until times
of crisis or distress. The corporate scandals of 2001–02
and the economic recession of 2007–2008 offer numerous
examples of risk management breakdowns and hindsight
or reactive responses to those failings.7

Chart 1

Compound annual growth rates 2004–11* by risk maturity level
Companies with more mature risk management practices generated
the highest growth in revenue, EBITDA, and EBITDA/EV.
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Source: Ernst & Young, Turning Risk into Results: How Leading Companies Use Risk Management
to Fuel Better Performance, February 2012.

An Overview of ERM Concepts
In business, tension often exists between risk management
and profit maximization. Boards and managers must
constantly strive to strike an appropriate balance between
the two. The corporate scandals and general failures of
the early 2000s highlighted the difficulties in managing
this tension. In response, the government developed new
risk-related disclosure regulations and a new framework for
risk management.8 These included the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
new listing standards for the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE), and the U.S. Department of Justice’s revised
sentencing guidelines.
The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the
Treadway Commission (COSO) developed an ERM
framework to assist companies with operating in this new
regulatory environment. ERM is “a process, effected by
an entity’s board of directors, management and other
personnel, applied in strategy setting and across the
enterprise, designed to identify potential events that may
affect the entity, and manage risk to be within its risk
appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the
achievement of entity objectives.”9 ERM focuses on the
potential risks to and related consequences for the entire
company—not just the specific departments or units
responsible for foreseeable risks or risk-seeking activities.10
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Commentators frequently quote the
proverb “no risk, no reward” in the
business context. Yet, calculated
risk is fundamentally different
from rash or unmitigated risk.
The latter often leads to negative
consequences, including signiﬁcant
economic losses, litigation, missed
business opportunities, and failed
business models. Boards must strive
to proactively identify and evaluate
their companies’ risk proﬁles and
accept only calculated risks that are
commensurate with their companies’
risk appetites. ERM is a key tool in
this endeavor.
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At its core, ERM encourages companies to develop a
disciplined process for identifying, assessing, mitigating,
and monitoring potential risks to the enterprise through
both vertical and horizontal prisms. This approach
requires a company to look within its individual entities,
departments, and units, and then across those divisions to
create a more complete risk picture. In this regard, COSO’s
model for implementing ERM seeks to identify risks to the
company’s objectives at every level of the enterprise (e.g.,
entity, department, unit) while focusing assessment and
mitigation plans on eight interrelated components:11
1 Internal environment
2 Objective setting
3 Event identification
4 Risk assessment
5 Risk response
6 Control activities
7 Information and communication

There is no one right way to implement ERM, and companies
should tailor their ERM programs to their particular
industry, strategic plan, and internal needs. Focusing on
communication channels and risk ownership will help
companies integrate risk assessment throughout the
enterprise. Integration, in turn, will reduce the likelihood
that risks become trapped in silos and underappreciated by
boards and senior management.17

Corporate Governance Considerations
In the United States, state law typically vests the board
with management authority over the corporation.18
Directors serve in a fiduciary capacity, with the company
and its shareholders as the primary beneficiaries.19 As such,
directors owe duties of care and loyalty, with the latter
generally including an obligation of good faith.20 The duty
of care generally requires directors to be fully informed and
diligent when making their business decisions.21 The duty
of loyalty mandates, among other things, that directors
remain free from conflicts and act selflessly, in good faith,
and with the corporation’s best interests at heart.22

8 Monitoring

COSO suggests that effective implementation of ERM
requires a top-down approach, with the board playing a
critical role in fostering a risk-aware culture, setting the
company’s risk appetite, and reconciling that appetite with
the company’s risk profile.12
Procedures for implementing effective ERM programs are
still emerging.13 ERM implementation requires the board
and senior management to map out the company’s business
strategies and potential barriers to those strategies. In fact,
many companies use their strategic plans as blueprints for
their ERM programs. A successful ERM program capitalizes
on the synergies between mitigating a company’s risk exposure
and achieving its strategic and operational objectives.14
Boards must understand all elements of potential risks
to align them with their companies’ risk appetites and
strategic plans. That level of understanding requires effective
communication across the enterprise, which companies can
foster by establishing clear channels of communication and
identifying risk owners. Many companies have implemented
reporting systems for allegations concerning harassment,
discrimination, and illegal activity. In fact, these types
of whistleblower provisions are often incorporated into
companies’ codes of ethics.15 Developing similar reporting
systems for the identification of potential operational or
financial risk events is one path to encourage meaningful
risk communication.16
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An effective ERM program may help directors comply with
their fiduciary duties in multiple respects. For example, in
evaluating duty of care claims, courts typically consider
whether directors were informed regarding the issue under
consideration, made reasonable inquiries concerning the
matter, understood key components and critiques of the
proposed action, and were deliberative in their decisionmaking process.23 ERM contributes positively to several
of these factors.24 The enhanced communication and
information flow underlying ERM should strengthen
the utility of boards’ decision-making processes, making
it more difficult for plaintiffs to overcome the board’s
traditional protection under the business judgment rule.25
Moreover, monitoring and managing a company’s risks are
at the core of ERM, which directly implicates directors’ duty
to monitor. “The duty to monitor is an obligation to prevent
harm to the corporation.”26 Although originally perceived
as a subset of the duty of care, duty to monitor claims are
now commonly viewed as invoking standards applicable to
duty of loyalty claims. These standards require that plaintiffs
establish, at a minimum, a knowing dereliction of duty or
“a sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise
oversight—such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a
reasonable information and reporting system exists.”27 As
the Delaware Court of Chancery explained in In re Citigroup
Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, these standards create
an “extremely high burden” for plaintiffs.28

Director Notes the potential cost and value of Erm

3

In Citigroup, the plaintiffs argued that the directors breached
their duty to monitor by not mitigating Citigroup’s risk
exposure. Citigroup’s substantial investment in mortgagebacked securities was a risk that led to significant shareholder
losses and government bailouts. The plaintiffs argued that
the Citigroup board ignored indicators of the deteriorating
subprime mortgage market. Although the court recognized
a board’s heightened duty to act when “red flags” suggest
wrongdoing at the company, it found that the plaintiffs’
evidence was, at best, evidence of bad business decisions.29
The court rejected the plaintiffs’ asserted duty to monitor
claims and granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss.
The business judgment rule ultimately protected the
board’s decisions in Citigroup and in similar cases involving
AIG and Goldman Sachs.30 Nevertheless, individuals
serving on those boards were named as defendants in
very high-profile, expensive lawsuits, and their decisions
apparently did cause economic harm to their companies
and shareholders—so any victory they attained was
bittersweet in some respects. In addition, Citigroup and
subsequent cases leave open the possibility of director
liability for failures in monitoring and oversight.31 As
then-Chancellor William Chandler explained in Citigroup,
“A plaintiff can show bad faith conduct by, for example,
properly alleging particularized facts that show that
a director consciously disregarded an obligation to be
reasonably informed about the business and its risks or
consciously disregarded the duty to monitor and oversee
the business.”32
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A thoughtful and integrated ERM program may enhance
board protections in litigation and, more importantly,
improve its decision-making processes. A board that
implements and nurtures an ERM program will be
overseeing the active identification and management of
potential risks to the enterprise. If structured appropriately,
the program should foster more complete and meaningful
risk reports to the board and more coordinated responses
to both enterprise-level risks and those being managed
by individual departments and units. Indeed, an effective
ERM program might well serve as a prophylactic measure
against any purported breaches of the duty to monitor.

Regulatory Compliance Considerations
The corporate scandals of the early 2000s and the economic
crisis of 2008 have led to enhanced regulation of company
activities on multiple fronts. For example, Sarbanes-Oxley
enhanced standards for corporate governance and reporting.
The SEC amended its proxy guidelines to require disclosure
of the board’s role in the company’s risk management.33
The NYSE likewise revised its listing standards to redefine
corporate independence, addressing both internal controls
and codes of ethics, and specifically identifying risk
management as a function of an audit committee.34
Companies that fail to comply may be subject to agency
investigations, litigation, and sanctions.35
Regulatory compliance is an integral part of ERM.
A company cannot assess accurately its risk profile
without a comprehensive understanding of the regulatory
environment in which it operates. ERM may itself help
a company comply with applicable regulations, reduce
the impact of certain compliance failures, and produce
other external benefits. For example, Standard & Poor’s
considers the existence of an ERM program in rating any
given company.36 ERM can complement and strengthen a
company’s existing internal controls, code of ethics, and
compliance culture.
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Other Considerations
In light of the potential governance and compliance
benefits, the question shifts from why a company should
implement ERM to why it would not. Like most initiatives,
ERM has potential costs and implementation challenges
that may limit its positive impact.37 The following section
summarizes certain countervailing factors. Although each
company must make its own assessment, on balance, ERM
appears well worth the effort.
Increased cost ERM may be viewed as yet another layer
of administrative expense that increases overhead and
negatively impacts the bottom line.38 That perception may
hold some truth. Companies may hire a chief risk officer
or need additional personnel and resources to implement
an ERM program. Some companies retain outside
consultants to design their ERM programs and address
related programmatic needs. ERM may also identify risks
or potential issues that require mitigation plans and the
expenditure of considerable resources to support those
plans. Companies should be aware of the potential costs
associated with any ERM program and factor those into
their cost-benefit analysis.

Chart 2

Designated individual to
serve as CRO or equivalent
There has been a notable increase over prior years
in the percentage of organizations that have
formally designated an individual to serve
as the chief risk ofﬁcer (CRO) or
equivalent senior risk executive.
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Source: Mark Beasley, Bruce Branson, and Bonnie Hancock,
“Current State of Enterprise Risk Oversight: Progress Is Occurring
but Opportunities for Improvement Remain,” July 2012, 17.

www.conferenceboard.org

Additional work Similarly, ERM may be viewed as creating
additional “busy work” that distracts managers from
their primary responsibility—running the business.39
This view of ERM as a “check-the-box” exercise done
outside of ordinary job responsibilities undercuts the true
value of ERM. Employees at all levels should identify and
assess potential risks in the ordinary course of business
on a daily basis. ERM is designed, in part, to underscore
the importance of this integrated risk assessment—a task
that boards, managers, and employees already should be
undertaking. ERM is not new or additional work; it is a
more disciplined and effective way to perform that work.
Impede innovation A pure risk identification and
mitigation approach to ERM might suggest that companies
forgo valuable, yet risky, opportunities. In other words,
ERM might cause companies to become too risk averse.40
That should not be the objective or result of a properly
structured ERM program. Rather, companies should use
ERM to reduce barriers to innovation and foster projects
within the companies’ risk appetites.41
Minimal impact ERM has received mixed reviews
regarding its impact on the bottom line. Some companies
appear to have gotten lost in the process—almost paralyzed
by the information output. A company that becomes
consumed by the process itself or is unable to discern and
address entity level and emerging risks likely will not realize
much value from an ERM process.42 As one commentator
notes, “ERM is only as effective as it is able to produce a
risk radar that is meaningful and forward looking.”43 The
value in ERM comes from understanding the companies’
objectives and designing an ERM program that minimizes
barriers to the company’s forward trajectory.
Misunderstood Boards may reject ERM because they
do not understand the concept or its application to their
company. In 2011, a study of corporate directors indicated
that boards have not increased the amount of time spent
on reviewing and approving company risk management
strategies and that they lack the requisite knowledge to
do so.44 Directors reported dedicating only 14 percent
of their time to risk management.45 In addition, boards
may assign primary responsibility for ERM functions
to the accounting or financial departments and, in the
process, lose sight of the cross-functional goal of ERM.46
Accordingly, before adopting any ERM program, boards
should take the time to understand ERM and how it might
assist the company in achieving its objectives.
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Potential Upside with Little Downside Risk
ERM can facilitate sound corporate governance practices
that are likely to have a positive impact on multiple aspects
of a company’s operations.47

Admittedly, there are challenges associated with ERM, and
companies should not undertake an ERM program halfheartedly. Nonetheless, studies suggest that, if executed
properly, ERM increases the flow of risk information and
leads to better-informed decisions, greater consensus,
and better communication with management—i.e., better
management.48 “Better management translates into the
increased ability to meet strategic goals, reduced earnings
volatility, and increased profitability.”49 Accordingly, any
downside risk associated with ERM likely is outweighed by
its potential value.

With proper planning, companies can implement ERM
in a manner that mitigates more than financial risk.
They can improve communication and discipline in their
decision-making processes and address cross-functional
risks such as legal, operational, and personnel matters. In
addition, effective ERM programs may help boards comply
with various legal rules and regulations and satisfy their
fiduciary duties to companies and shareholders.

Table 1

Companies with advanced ERM experience greater returns.
Advanced
ERM companies
Rank

Percent

All other
companies
Rank

Percent

Better informed decisions**

1

86%

1

58%

Greater management consensus***

2

83

2

36

Increased management accountability***

3

79

3

34

Smoother government practices***

4

79

4

39

Ability to meet strategic goals***

5

76

5

36

Better communication to board+

6

69

6

52

Reduced earnings volatility**

7

62

7

37

Increased proﬁtability**

8

59

8

33

Use risk as competitive tool**

9

46

9

22

Accurate risk-adjusted pricing*

10

41

10

21

*** 99.9% likelihood of signiﬁcant difference between advanced ERM and all other companies
** 99% likelihood of signiﬁcant difference between advanced ERM and all other companies
* 95% likelihood of signiﬁcant difference between advanced ERM and all other companies
+ 90% likelihood of signiﬁcant difference between advanced ERM and all other companies
Source: Matteo Tonello, Emerging Governance Practices in Enterprise Risk Management, The Conference Board
R-1398-07-WG, February 2007.
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